HAL Id HAL Id: hal-04153322 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers , des laboratoires publics ou privés HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752- 023-00441-5￿. HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194- HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/ Université Paris HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it ( Schlosser HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization ( Barandiaran HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [ 1790]1987 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela ( 1979 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among— the constituents HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [ 1790]1987 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte HAL Id: hal-04153322 https://hal.science/hal-04153322v1 Submitted on 6 Jul 2023 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- entific research documents, whether they are pub- lished or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in F rance or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio T o cite this version: Louis Virenque, Matteo Mossio. What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory . Biological Theory , 2023, ￿10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5￿. ￿hal-04153322￿ 1 What is Agency? A View from Autonomy Theory To appear in Biological Theory The final publication is available at Springer via: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-023-00441-5 Louis Virenque1 ORCID : 0009-0007-1194-716X Matteo Mossio1* ORCID : 0000-0003-0831-0815 1IHPST, CNRS/Université Paris 1, Paris, France *corresponding author: Matteo.Mossio@univ-paris1.fr Abstract The theory of biological autonomy provides a natura lized characterization of agency, understood as a general biological phenomenon that extends beyond the domain of intentionality and causation by mental states. Agency refers to the capacity of autonomous living beings (roughly speaking: organisms) to purp osively and functionally control the interactions with the environment, and to adaptively modulate their own self-determining organization and behavior so as to maintain their own existence, construed as their intrinsic telos. We mention some crucial strengths of the autonomist conception of agency, and some interesting challenges that it faces. Among the latter, we focus on the intertwined relationships between agency and evolution, as well as on the transition between agency and cognition. Keywords Adaptivity; Agency; Autonomy; Autopoiesis; Cognition; Evolution; Purposiveness 2 Introduction In the mainstream conception, the notion of agency is related to intentionality. Action is intentional behavior, which means behavior performed for a rea son, oriented toward a goal. A behavior, in turn, can be said to be performed for a reason only if it is caused by certain mental states (as desires and beliefs) that have a representational content related to the goal and the means to attain it (Schlosser 2019). In such a conception, agency is usually attributed to a very specific class of living systems, namely human beings ( Frankfurt 1978; Davidson 1982). Yet linking agency to the mind is not the only possible stance; living beings at large can also be characterized as agents by relying on a more general (and yet naturalized) understanding of purposiveness. The theory of biological autonomy provides such a characterization. In a nutshell, the theory of biological autonomy holds that a system is an agent if it is capable of interacting with its environment in such a way that its behavior is, first, enabled by its own constitutive organization and, second, contributing to maintain that very organization (Barandiaran et al. 2009; Arnellos and Moreno 2015; Moreno and Mossio 2015). The origins of the theory of autonomy can be traced back to Kant ( [1790]1987) and, more recently, to Varela (1979). A central leitmotif of older and more recent accounts of autonomy is the idea that it is not possible to adequately make sense of the nature and behavior of a living being by appealing only to mechanistic methods and concepts, which consist of explaining a phenomenon in terms of the properties of—and interactions among—the constituents of the relevant system. Instead, the theory of autonomy submits that living beings possess a distinctive organization that, to use the famous Kantian formula ( [1790]1987), can be legitimately said to be "cause and effect of itself ." Thereby, living beings are (in Kant's terminology) self-organizing natural systems. In particular, and in contrast to mechanistic systems, the constituents o f self -organizing systems at the same time produce and are produced by the totality to which they belong. As a consequence, the explanatory 3 relationship becomes circular: the properties of (and interactions among) the constituents account for the whole organization, and vice versa. By relying on the circular organization of living beings, the theory of autonomy provides a naturalized ground for several concepts whose scientific legitimacy beyond the human domain is questioned, such as goals, norms, function, and, in particular, agency. Agency, therefore, is accounted for by means of a specific characte