Meeting of the Aristotelian Society Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C. l, on 3rd June, 1957, at 7.30 p.m. XIV.-INTENTION By G. E. M. ANSCOMBE What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that suggests itself is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is defined as that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting. But this hardly gets us any further, because the questions ' What is the relevant sense of the question " Why? " ' and ' What is meant by " re;;i.son for acting " ? ' are one and the same. To see the difficulties here, consider the question ' Why did you knock the cup off the table?' answered by' I thought I saw a face at the window and it made me jump.' Now we cannot say that since the answer mentions something previous to the action, this will be a cause as opposed to a reason; for if you ask ' Why did you kill him? ' the answer ' he killed my father ' is surely a reason rather than a cause, but what it mentions is previous to the action. It is true that we don't ordinarily think of a case like giving a sudden start when we speak of a reason for acting. ' Giving a sudden start ', someone might say, ' is not acting in the sense suggested by the expression "reason for acting".' Hence, though indeed we readily say e.g. ' What was the reason for your starting so violently? ' this is totally unlike ' What is your reason for excluding so-and-so from your will? ' or ' What is your reason for sending for a taxi? ' But what is the difference ? Why is giving a start or gasp not an ' action ', while sending for a taxi or crossing the road is one? The answer cannot be ' Because an answer to the question " why? " may give a reason in the latter cases ', for the answer may ' give a reason ' in the former cases too; and 2K This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 322 G, E, M. ANSCOMBE we cannot say 'Ah, but not a reason for acting;' we should be going round in circles. We need to find the difference between the two kinds of' reason' without talking about ' acting '; and if we do, perhaps we shall discover what is meant by ' acting' when it is said with this special emphasis. It will hardly be enlightening to say ' in the case of the sudden start the "reason'' is a cause'; the topic of causality is in a state of too great confusion; all we know is that this is one of the places where we do use the word ' cause '. But we also know that this is rather a strange case of causality; the subject is able to give a cause of a thought or feeling or bodily movement in the same kind of way as he is able to state the place of his pain or the position of his limbs. Such statements are not based on observation. Nor can we say: 'Well, the "reason" for a movement is a cause, and not a reason in the sense of "reason for acting ", when the movement is involuntary; it is a reason as opposed to a cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional.' This is partly because in any case the object of the whole enquiry is really to delineate such concepts as the voluntary and the intentional, and partly because one can also give a ' reason ' which is only a ' cause ' for what is voluntary and intentional. E.g. ' Why are you walking up and down like that? ' - ' It's that military band; it excites me.' Or 'What made you sign the document at last?'-' The thought:" It is my duty" kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself" I can do no other", and so signed.' Now we can see that the cases where this difficulty arises are just those where the cause itself, qua cause, (or perhaps one should rather say the causation itself) is in the class of things known without observation. I will call the type of cause in question a ' mental cause '. Mental causes are possible, not only for actions (' The martial music excites me, that is why I walk up and down ') but This content downloaded from 132.174.234.36 on Fri, 05 Sep 2025 17:48:40 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTENTION 323 also for feelings and even thoughts. In considering actions, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and motives; in considering feelings, such as fear or anger, it is important to distinguish between mental causes and objects of feeling. To see this, consider the following cases: A child saw a bit of red stuff on a turn in a stairway and asked what it was. He thought his nurse told him it was a bit of Satan and felt dreadful fear of it. (No doubt she said it was a bit of satin.) What he was frightened of was the bit of stuff; the cause of his fright was his nurse's remark. The object of fear may be the cause of fear, but, as Wittgenstein1 remarks, is not as such the cause of fear. (A hideous face appearing at the window would of course be both cause and object, and hence the two are easily confused.) Or again, you may be a